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Innovation in the local context – A case study of BYD in China 
 
 
Abstract  
In this paper we have used the case of BYD to examine firm innovation in the China context. 
From a historical perspective, with its strategic diversification from battery to mobile phone 
manufacturing to automobile manufacturing, we find that BYD has been innovative in its 
production method, vertical integration strategy, and design of product for local customers. The 
effective understanding and leveraging of local contextual factors including supply of labor 
(especially low cost-highly skilled labor), growing middle class, and local industry environments 
have played important roles for BYD’s innovation in China. 
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1. Introduction 
 China's share of global R&D investment grew to 13% in 2011 (compared with US with 
34%, Europe 23%, and Japan 12%), and it surpassed the United States in 2011 in terms of patent 
application numbers filed through its intellectual property office (WIPO 2013). However, 
debates remain on the innovativeness of Chinese firms.  
Out of 1.2million patents that were granted domestically in China in 2014, invention patents, 
which have the highest level of innovativeness in patent evaluations, only accounted for about 
13%. (Data calculated from Chinese government SIPO annual patent report) In comparison, 
utility patents in the Unites States, which are equivalent to invention patents in China, accounted 
for about 90% of total patents granted in 2014 (USPTO data). 
At firm level, one study on Apple's products (iPod and iphone) value-added at different 
stages from different vendors shows that Chinese manufacturers are only able to claim less than 
2% of the entire gross margin (Dedrick, Kraemer, Linden, 2010; Dedrick 2012), which indicates 
a low level of technology innovativeness of those manufacturers. Meanwhile, although the 
number of R&D labs established in China by multinational corporations grew at an astoundingly 
high speed expanded over 10 times since the late 1990s, relatively low value added modules of 
R&D are still conducted in China to prevent intellectual property right leakage and correspond to 
a lack to comprehensive R&D talents in China. (Quan & Chesbrough, 2010) Some argue that 
most Chinese firms don’t invest enough money in research (Simon, 2013). 
 Innovation however is not all about technology innovation. According to Schumpeter’s 
definition, innovation is to carry out new combinations. There are five types of new 
combinations—production of new types of goods; introduction of the new method of production; 
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opening of a new market; use of the new sources of raw materials and intermediate goods; and 
new organization of production. (Schumpeter, 1934) 
GM China president Kevin Wale observes that innovation in China’s auto industry is 
more about commercialization than technical achievements. Indeed, as a recent McKinsey study 
pointed out, Chinese innovation is evolving in diverse ways and at an uneven pace across a range 
of different industries. (McKinsey Quarterly, 2012) 
 Scholars have been trying to explore the Chinese ways of innovation, as shown in the 
following literature review section. However there is still no consensus reached regarding an 
overarching archetypal Chinese model of innovation. Due to the exploratory nature of the topic, 
in this paper we use a case study of a Chinese company BYD to help explore the nature of the 
Chinese way of innovation.  
2. The Chinese way of innovation 
Indigenous innovation has become a popular term in China especially after the Chinese 
government advocated using an indigenous innovation strategy to build China into an 
innovation-based economy. The indigenous innovation policy became explicit in 2006 in China; 
however discussions on indigenous innovation started earlier than that. In his book, from a 
historical perspective, Lu (2000) thoroughly studied four computer companies in China including 
Stone, Legend(now Lenovo), Founder, and Great Wall Computer, which all started with 
indigenous innovation with a ‘top-down model of technology learning’ (where firms started with 
product design) and later adopted vertical integration strategy to build up their manufacturing 
capabilities. Indigenous innovation was a key prerequisite of the top-down technology learning 
model there.  
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Liu and Cheng (2011) examine China’s indigenous innovation strategy from the 
perspective of national innovation system, involving entities such as central and regional 
governments, university and research institutes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private 
businesses, and research consortia.  Grimes and Du (2013) discuss some dilemma between 
multinational corporations’ R&D efforts in China and the indigenous innovation policy which 
are emphasized by the government. A most recent paper concludes that theories on innovation in 
China are still scarce and calls for more focus on China’s indigenous innovation capabilities 
(Vinig & Bossink, 2015).  
However the concept of indigenous innovation, which emphasizes the source of 
innovation that should derive from domestic Chinese firms, is still opaque as the main 
characteristics of innovation remain unexamined. Much studies are still needed to research on 
how exactly Chinese firms innovate in the China market.  
Recently, scholars and practitioners have come up with various terms to try to 
characterize the way of innovation of Chinese firms. Steinfeld and Beltoft (2014) believe that the 
China style of innovation comes from making ideas commercially viable, whether it involves 
product design in the semiconductor industry or novel ways of component sourcing in the wind 
turbine manufacturing.  Erik Roth, a partner at McKinsey & Co.'s Shanghai office, also identifies 
the Chinese way of innovation as innovation through commercialization, and believe that 
Chinese firms figured out a way to dominate their markets by adapting existing technologies and 
business models. 
Through interviews with 23 Chinese companies, Williamson and Yin (2014) find that Chinese 
companies are adopting an accelerated innovation approach, which allows them to reduce the 
time it takes to bring innovative products to mainstream market. An example is Lenovo, which 
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purchased IBM’s PC business in 2005, and had since then managed to cut the new product 
development cycle in half to 6 to 9 months (from 12 to18 months previously). Another recent 
research on innovation by companies in China reports that there are at least eight types of 
innovation: cost innovation, process innovation, application innovation, supply chain innovation, 
product innovation, technological innovation, business model innovation, and non-customer 
innovation. (Yip & McKern, 2014)  
Despite increasing attentions given to examine how Chinese firms innovate, the main 
characteristics of the Chinese approach to innovation still need further research, especially that 
how firms innovate corresponding to local context challenges. Our paper uses a case study to 
examine the China style of innovation in the local context in details.   
3. Research method 
It is well accepted that “how” or “why” questions are more explanatory when using case 
studies, since such questions ‘deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather 
than mere frequencies or incidence’ (Eisenhardt , 1989; Yin, 1994). This paper hence uses an in-
depth case study method to investigate how firms innovate in the China context and the case of 
BYD Auto -- a Chinese domestic grown auto company-- is analyzed. The case study method 
allows the development of an initial theoretical understanding of the unique way of Chinese 
firms’ innovation in the local context.  
The case BYD Auto was selected due to the following reasons: First, the automotive 
industry in China has experienced rapid growth in the past two decades. China became the 
world’s largest automotive market in 2009. China’s share of global auto production grew from 
3.5% in 2000 to 26.4% in 2014 (OICA data), and it became the largest auto producer in the 
world in 2008. Second, as a relatively young company, BYD Auto emerged as one of the top 
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three China brand car manufacturers in just ten years since its formation. Third, BYD is 
recognized as an innovative company in the world. In 2010, BusinessWeek ranked BYD the 8th 
most innovative company in the world, ahead of Ford, Volkswagen and BMW. (Einhorn and 
Arndt, 2010). Fourth, as a private firm (instead of a state-owned enterprise), BYD represents an 
emerging force of innovation growing in China in the recent decade. Lastly, it is worth 
mentioning that BYD is not just an automotive company. It first started as a battery 
manufacturer, then expanded into the field of mobile phone manufacturing, then move to become 
a star in the automotive industry. This seemingly unique development path in fact also represents 
a common scene of diversification that can be observed among many Chinese firms.  
The case analysis is based on eight in-depth interviews with senior managers of BYD 
Auto totaling 12 hours and 31 minutes' interview time resulting 143 pages of interview 
transcripts (in Chinese language). Specifically, the interviewees include: 1)  Chuanfu Wang, the 
founder, President and Chairman, for two hours and twelve minutes’ interview (transcript pp. 1-
28)  2)  Zhibing Xia, General Manager for Sales, for two hours and seven minutes (pp. 28-56) 3) 
Huanming Liu, Director of Human Resource, for forty minutes (pp. 56-64) 4) Zhanghui Hang, 
Director of Intellectual Property, for two hours and ten minutes (pp. 64-86) 5) Yizao Sun, Vice 
President for one hour and forty five minutes (pp 86-104), 6) Hongbo Deng, a manager who is 
among the earliest hired employees for twenty minutes (pp. 104-109);  7)  Nianqiang Wang, 
Vice President, for two hours and two minutes (pp. 109-130)  8) Qing Gong, Director of the 
Central Research Institute, for one hour and ten minutes (pp. 130-143). The interview transcripts 
were obtained as a result of the Chinese government’s efforts, and questions were asked by a 
CCTV correspondent in 2008. The questions cover broad business aspects of BYD ranging from 
 7 
its history, to products, to market, competition, R&D, patent protection, production line, and to 
human resource management strategies, all of which centered on BYD’s innovation efforts.  
 To supplement the interviews, we have also obtained information on BYD from other 
sources such as websites, newspapers, magazines and other research reports.  For instance, we 
studied the transcript of Chuanfu Wang's announcement on the new auto product F6 and the 
following Q&A section in 2007, which contains information on BYD’s product innovation.  
 
4. The case of BYD and its innovation 
 
BYD, short for 'Build Your Dream', was founded in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, in 
1995. It began as a rechargeable-battery factory, competing in the Chinese market against 
Japanese imports. Within ten years, BYD captured more than half the world's mobile-phone 
battery market and became the largest Chinese manufacturer (and in the top four worldwide) of 
all types of rechargeable batteries. (Fishman, 2006) BYD Auto was formed in 2003 when BYD 
purchased Tsinchuan Automobile Company. BYD obtained RMB 55 Billion in revenue in 2014 
in total, and Figure 1 shows the contribution of each category of products to BYD’s total 
turnover in 2013 and in 2014 respectively. BYD built on its battery expertise to produce some of 
China’s most innovative automobiles. In 2010, BusinessWeek ranked BYD the 8th most 
innovative company in the world, ahead of Ford, Volkswagen and BMW. (Einhorn and Arndt, 
2010) 
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Figure 1: BYD turnover breakdown by product categories 
 
 
 
Source: BYD Company Limited Annual Report 2014. 
4.1 Product design to meet local taste  
BYD Auto had made cars for only seven years when its F3 compact model became the 
top-selling car in China. The F3 model led China’s compact car segment in November 2008 with 
sales of more than 17,000 units, an increase of 92% over November 2007. In 2009, BYD sold 
440,000 vehicles. (Automotive News, 2010) The success of the model in a large part comes from 
the appropriate design of the vehicle.  
As the Chinese society emphasize the importance of face (‘mianzi’ in Chinese) in its 
social value and relations (Hwang, 1987), the concept of face also needs to be embedded in the 
products. This helps shape the design of BYD’s F3 auto model. According to Chuanfu Wang, the 
founder and Chairman of BYD, “In China, besides moving people around, an important function 
of an automobile is to show face, (or status and prestige,) of the car owner. So the design of the 
car should be decent and show some grandiosity. In the west, people drive cars by themselves, 
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and there is usually just one person in the car - the driver. But in China, typically you carry your 
whole family or several friends or colleagues in your car, and important people usually sit in the 
back seat. Therefore the back seat needs to be very spacious. That’s how BYD designs its 
models. The exterior look of the F3 model is decent, and it’s very spacious inside, especially for 
people sitting in the back seat.” (Interview) The F3 model is targeted as family entry level car in 
China. BYD’s later auto models such as F6, F8, and F3R have also followed the same design 
concept.   
Furthermore, recognizing that the Chinese consumers are very price sensitive,  Chairman 
Wang emphasized, “The price of the car must be cheap. Our average household income is still 
low, compared with many developed countries. So, we set our price for the F3 model in the 
range of several ten thousands RMB. For about ¥70,000 RMB (roughly $10,000 USD at the 
time), you’ll be able to get a very spacious car with much high quality electronics equipment in 
the car, and a car body length of 4.5 meters.”(Interview)  BYD is going to mass produce the 
world’s cheapest automobile and bring inexpensive motoring to the masses in China. BYD’s cars 
have been priced from ¥30,000 RMB (about $4,400) to ¥100,000RMB (about $14,600), which 
includes their product lines from mini cars to large sedans. (China Car Times, 2010) 
Furthermore, BYD Auto has marched further to the electric car market. Since its release of the 
model Qin in 2014, it has been dominating the electric car market in China. (See Figure 2) 
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Figure 2: China electric car registrations  
 
Source: EVObsession.com  
4.2 The Chinese way of production 
BYD’s battery products has clearly demonstrated its innovative way of production. BYD 
managed to slash the price of batteries by replacing robots and machines in the manufacturing 
process with an army of low cost workers. As Chairman Wang stated, “for electric cars, the key 
is in the battery technology, which is also our great competitive advantage.” (Interview) 
Let us examine BYD’s battery production from a historical perspective. When BYD was 
founded in the mid-1990s, the battery market in China was already large. About 90% of the 
batteries were imported from Japan, at extremely high prices. As a chemist and material scientist, 
Chuanfu Wang decided to start the firm BYD to produce batteries. At that time, a fully 
automated production line for lithium-ion rechargeable batteries cost at least $100 million USD, 
which was beyond imagination for the young entrepreneur. “In order to achieve our goal (of 
making lithium-ion batteries), we had to design our own production line then. We spent a lot of 
time and efforts to research the battery product and its production line. At the end, it cost us 
about 20 million RMB (less than $3 million USD) to build a semi-automated production line, 
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with similar capacity of production (to the fully automated $100 million facility). For the semi-
automated line, we needed a lot of workers. Since labor costs were very low, it helped us 
dramatically lower our overall costs. In 1998, we could sell one lithium-ion battery at $3 USD, 
while Japanese firms asked for $8 USD for a similar battery. With a $3 selling price, we still had 
about 60% gross margin for each battery. So we became very competitive then.” (Interview)   
BYD was the first Chinese company that was able to make lithium-ion battery. The 
production method invented by BYD helped lower the entry barrier for many local firms, in 
terms of capital requirements. The company also automatically became a training base for talents 
in the battery industry. Due to the high employee turnover rate in China, many employees left 
BYD and started their own battery manufacturing. As a result, there are about 100 lithium-ion 
battery manufacturers now in China, and the price of battery has dropped dramatically.   
The fast growth of BYD was made possible by the huge pool of low cost-high quality 
labor in China. Employment has increased almost exponentially since BYD was founded. In 
1997, BYD had only a few hundred employees. In 1998, it grew to 3000. Employment expanded 
to 10,000 in 1999; over 30,000 in 2004, 50,000 in 2005, and about 130,000 in 2009. “We go to 
the best universities in China every year to recruit fresh students. It is not hard to hire good 
people since lots of university graduates cannot find jobs these days. Once they are hired, we 
train our employees well, and give them plenty of promotion opportunities and company stock 
options to retain good people.” according to Mr. Huaming Liu, the Human Resource Director of 
BYD. Workers on the floor have lower education levels, and it was very easy and inexpensive to 
find enough of them. (Interview) 
4.3. BYD’s Vertical Integration Strategy 
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BYD implements a strategy of vertical integration, unlike many firms in the western 
developed world. In a relatively mature market for a complicated product, typically a firm 
collaborates with many specialized suppliers to increase efficiency and focus its own resources 
on the few important elements that form their core competency, and which maximize their value 
creation. However, in the case of BYD, vertical integration was adopted.  
BYD’s vertical integration dated back to its battery production. According to Nianqiang 
Wang, VP of BYD, “after we mastered the core technology [of battery], we started to integrate 
back to the raw materials and many components … The biggest advantage [of this backward 
integration] is cost. We were able to lower the cost of the batteries.” (Interview)  
Later on vertical integration was adopted to its mobile phone manufacturing in 2003, 
when BYD undertook a task on mobile phones for Siemens. At that time, a common pattern for 
mobile phone manufacturing was for a multinational corporation from developed countries such 
as US or Germany to create a design for the entire mobile phone, and also for many components 
of the handset. Local firms in China then started to manufacture these components based on the 
blueprints and specifications provided. “Each component supplier is usually allowed a small 
range of deviation from the original design parameters. There are over a hundred components for 
a mobile phone. When Siemens finally received all components from its suppliers, it found the 
phone was not able to function.” says Ms. Qing Gong, the R&D Director of BYD. “Later, we 
found that the deviations were responsible for the problem. Even though each supplier was well 
within the allowable degree of deviation, the cumulative effect made the product unable to 
work.” (Interview) BYD then proposed to take over manufacturing and assembly of all the 
components of the mobile phone, and promised a complete functioning product for Siemens. 
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BYD’s vertical integration strategy worked, and the same idea was later applied to its other 
customers such as Nokia and Motorola.        
The experience of vertical integration in mobile phone manufacturing laid a foundation 
for BYD’s auto manufacturing business model. “Most of the components of the automobile are 
done by us as well. We analyze all components at three different levels, and decide which 
components and their following integration may become bottleneck for the final product. We 
will research on that area first and solve potential integration problems. Through this method, we 
shortened our development cycle and lowered the overall costs.” (Interview with Qing Gong, 
R&D Director) The difficulties of integrating poorly specialized supply chain partners make 
vertical integration attractive in China's markets. 
5. The China context for BYD’s innovation  
BYD’s innovation regarding its product design, production method, and vertical integration 
strategy as discussed above illustrates the firm’s capability to adapt to the local context. Let’s now 
further understand the contextual factors for BYD’s innovation from a supply and demand 
perspective.     
5.1 The demand factor  
The substantial and rising number of people in the middle class with its growing income 
is transforming the Chinese consumer market. In 2006, the proportion of private consumption in 
China's total GDP was 38.0%, well below the world's average of 59.2%. The expansion of the 
middle class will help to boost the role of private consumption in the Chinese economy, turning 
it into a key driver of economic growth. (Hodgson, 2007)  A Chinese Academy of Social 
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Sciences (CASS) study found 19% of Chinese were middle class in 2003, up from 15% at the 
end of 1999.  This definition includes any household with assets worth $18,000 to $36,000. 
(BBC News, 2004)  Estimation from CNNMoney in 2012 put the number of the middle class in 
China at about 300million, which is about 25% of the population1.  A recent McKinsey study 
(Barton, Chen, and Jin, 2013) shows that more than 75 percent of China’s urban consumers will 
earn RMB 60,000 to 229,000 ($9,000 to $34,000) a year by 2022.  
Fast economic growth is a stunning fact of China with which few countries in the world 
can compare. China has maintained an average annual GDP growth of 8.1 percent over the past 
sixty years, according to China Daily (June 30, 2010). The per capita gross national income hit 
$2,770 in 2008, entering the lower-middle-income country bracket. While housing in big cities 
and luxury products in China are incredibly expensive for the local citizens, expenditures for 
daily necessities for the majority of Chinese consumers are still very low. This explains why 
attempting to become the supplier with the lowest price is still a viable competitive strategy in 
the China market, despite the fast growing economy and fledgling middle class.  
For many decades, Chinese consumers have followed the tastes of the developed 
countries, especially for high technology products that originated in the west. However, with the 
growing purchasing power of the middle class and of the government, the Chinese market has 
increasingly become essential for transnational firms. China has become the world’s biggest auto 
market, surpassing the U.S.  In 2009, total sales in China surged 46 percent to 13.46 million 
vehicles. In the first quarter of 2010, sales jumped 72 percent to 4.61 million. China’s tastes have 
now begun to influence the appearance and functions of some global products. For instance, 
General Motors design group frequently considers the “C-Factor”, a term referring to China’s 
                                                 
1 http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/25/news/economy/china-middle-class/index.htm 
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impact on American styling, according to GM global design chief, Ed Welburn. The latest design 
for Buick is influenced by “jade sculpture, calligraphy and a lot of the art dating back centuries”, 
said Welburn in an interview at the Beijing auto show in April 2010 (Greimel, 2010). Even at the 
high end, more and more research and development activities by multinational corporations in 
China are focused on global markets. (Quan and Chesbrough, 2010) This suggests that demand 
from China needs to be carefully studied and considered by firms looking for growth in this huge 
market. BYD’s clear understanding and insight of the local consumers and local culture was 
illustrated in its design of the car model, and the low pricing strategy fit well with the demand of 
the growing middle class in China.  
5.2 The supply factor – LC-HS labor 
Low cost labor has contributed significantly to China’s fast economic growth in the past 
few decades. Much has been discussed in literature about the immigrant workers from rural area 
who form the majority of the low cost manufacturing force across many industries, a deep pool 
of potentially 800 to 900 million workers, albeit decreasing in the recent years. There has also 
been abundant supply of Low Cost - Highly Skilled (LC-HS) labor in China, due to expansion of 
higher education over the past two decades. The LC-HS labor contributed significantly to the fast 
growth of many companies in China including BYD. 
Higher education in China has experienced a huge surge since 1998. Tertiary student 
enrollment did not reach one million until 1997. In the decade that followed it expanded to 5.4 
million by 2006. The annual growth rate was 22.2 percent during the 1998-2006 period, 
compared to 4.4 percent from 1985-1998.  However, the job market did not expand as quickly as 
higher education, resulting in the overwhelming phenomenon of “educated unemployment” in 
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China. From 2003 to 2005, unemployed bachelor degree holders at the point of leaving the 
university increased from 750,000 to 1.2 million. In 2004, there were 990,000 unemployed 
general degree holders, accounting for 41 percent of the total 2.4 million graduates. The problem 
worsened in 2009 when 2.0 million of the 6.3 million degree holders could not find jobs upon 
graduation2.  As a result, many young people face the problem of unemployment immediately 
after graduation and those who were fortunate enough to get hired became part of the low cost 
but highly skilled labor force in the Chinese economy due to overly abundant reserves there. The 
tremendous surge in the numbers of graduates from Chinese Universities, hence the consistent 
improvement in the quality of Chinese post-secondary education contribute to a rich and deep 
supply of talent in China, which have been fundamental to China’s economic development.  
Formed in 1995, BYD was able to quickly take advantage of the low cost labor in 
China—both high-skilled and low-skilled labor. BYD’s employee had experienced exponential 
growth since 1998. According to Mr. Liu, Director of Human Resource, “When I joined BYD in 
1997, there were only a few hundred employees. In 1998, the number of employees increased to 
3,000. It reached 10,000 around 1999. In 2004 we had over 30,000 employees, and grew to 
50,000 in 2005, and 100,000 employees in 2007”. The Human Resource Director believed it was 
not hard to hire good people since lots of university graduates could not find jobs. “In 2007, we 
hired more than 4500 fresh university graduates… we like to go to those best universities to 
recruit because we want first-class employees working for BYD. Although fresh graduates had 
no working experience, they are smart and intelligent, and can be great talent reserve for BYD’s 
future development.” Indeed, the availability of low cost labor made it possible for BYD to 
implement to its innovative production strategy of using an army of labor to replace capital-
                                                 
2 http://www.womenofchina.cn/Issues/Employment/217122.jsp 
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intensive robots for its battery production. The big number of low-paid scientists and technicians 
focus on small improvements to products, which can potentially create huge value for BYD. Later 
on, the development and manufacturing of cars at BYD also relied heavily on jigs—tools 
invented at BYD that help control quality while replacing robots with labor.   
 Many of the LC-HS workers have strong learning capability. Their diligent and hard-
working attitude contributes significantly to many firms’ growth. However a high employee 
turnover rate can also be observed in many industries. In fact China's staff turnover rate was the 
highest in Asia, more than twice that of Japan, according to a Youth Daily report. (People’s 
Daily online, Jan 2008) Across all industries, 47 percent of companies surveyed had turnover 
rates of more than 10 percent in the past 12 months, and 13 percent said that the rate was more 
than 20 percent. Unsatisfactory compensation and limited career progression were blamed for 
China's high turnover level. And fast learning capability and an entrepreneurial mindset of the 
LC-HS workers also propelled the high turnover rate. As mentioned earlier, BYD became a 
training base for talents in the battery industry, and many employees left BYD to start their own 
battery manufacturing in late 1990s and early 2000s. At BYD later on, in order to retain high 
skilled workers, BYD started to provide various benefits to employees such as offering stocks, 
low cost housing, childcare programs, and even providing private middles school education for 
employees’ children requiring very low tuition fees (at about only 10% of what they charge non-
BYD affiliated students). (Data source, Interview with Mr. Liu)  
 
5.3 Local industry environment with abundant opportunities 
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China are characterized by fast changing and volatile business environments (Sutcliffe & 
Zaheer, 1998; Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008) During BYD’s initial years of development (1995-
2000), relevant industries were at the beginning of the industry life cycle in China. That created 
huge amount of opportunities due to uncertainties in the China market such as the design or 
functions or price that end users will prefer, the distributions channels that will be most effective, 
and the players that may dominate the market.  
BYD was agile in catching opportunities emerging in the China market. On the one hand, 
BYD identified its initial opportunities in the battery market which at the time was dominated by 
big Japanese players such as Sanyo. Understanding the low cost driven mentality of Chinese 
consumers, BYD marched bluntly into the battery market and figured out ways to produce 
competitive battery products at much lower costs.  On the other hand, BYD moved quickly to the 
strategically related industries like handset manufacturing and automobile manufacturing in a 
timely manner to explore the huge unchartered market place. Both its handset segment and 
automobile manufacturing can rely heavily on BYD’s strong competitive advantage in battery 
production. As Chairman Chuanfu Wang stated, “I set a goal for myself to have the company 
grow 100% every year.” “I want to grow BYD big and fast. If BYD focused only on battery, the 
market size at most was a few hundred millions RMB; focusing on the mobile phone component 
business, market size for BYD can be at most a few billions RMB; by marching into the auto 
industry, we can grow our market size into tens of billions.”(Interview) This strategic 
diversification is a response from Chinese innovative firms like BYD to the unique China 
context which is characterized by big uncertainty and vast business opportunities.   
Meanwhile, the industry environment in China at the time lacked specialized suppliers in 
the market that firms like BYD can collaborate with. This helped lead to BYD’s vertical 
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integration strategy due to the nonexistence of a complete spectrum of specialist suppliers, or 
incapability of suppliers to provide as high quality components as customers need. BYD’s 
vertical integration in mobile phone manufacturing as discussed earlier well illustrated the issue. 
The concept of vertical integration was first proposed for its customer Siemens, then applied to 
Nokia and Motorola.  According to Qing Gong, the Director of BYD’s Central Research 
Institute, “[with vertical integration,] we were able to save our customers 20%-30% of their 
manufacturing costs, which they used to spend on communications with various suppliers.” 
(Interview)  
6. Further discussions 
Our case study of BYD examined in details how the firm succeeded in innovating in the 
local context. We discussed three important factors in the local context that contributed to its 
innovation including demand from the growing middle class in China, low cost – highly skilled 
(LC-HS) labor, and the unique local industry environment. The main goals of BYD’s innovation 
centered on low cost and customer satisfaction. We have observed its innovative product design 
to meet local taste, its innovative way of production, and the strategy of vertical integration in its 
products. Figure 3 uses a framework to illustrate our analysis.  
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Figure 3. BYD’s innovation in the local context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper we have only discussed three important local contextual factors as we see 
essential contributing to BYD’s innovation. There may still be other factors that remain to be 
examined. A comprehensive literature review paper (Yang, Liu, Gao, & Li, 2012) summarizes 
research on technological innovation in China, where the authors conclude research from three 
perspectives including external factors, internal factors, and interfirm cooperation factors. For 
external factors, three elements—government, culture, and market and competition were 
emphasized there.  For our study of BYD, we focus on the local context from a supply and 
demand perspective and also industry environment. Although the role of government was crucial 
for the early development of many industries in China such as computer industry (Lu, 2000) and 
software industry (Quan, 2008), it was not the case for BYD, which emerged purely as a private 
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firm. With China’s continuing economic reform, less and less government intervention can be 
observed for business development, especially in the private sector.   
Our research is limited as a single case study. We plan to examine more in-depth cases 
from China in the near future to help strengthen our theoretical building. We expect our findings 
on innovation practices from BYD can be extended to many other firms in China.  For instance, 
Williamson and Yin (2014) also state that a number of Chinese firms use the approach of 
“dividing the innovation process into a large number of small steps and then assign teams to 
work on each stage”. The goal is for this “assembly line” to accelerate the process and deliver 
results quickly (p28). They studied Chinese companies such as WuXi AppTec, a pharmaceutical, 
biopharmaceutical and medical-device outsourcing company, and their finding is similar to 
BYD’s innovative production method as we discussed earlier. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have used the case of BYD to examine firm innovation in the China 
context. From a historical perspective, with its strategic diversification from battery to mobile 
phone manufacturing to automobile manufacturing, we find that BYD has been innovative in its 
production method, vertical integration strategy, and design of product for local customers. Local 
contextual factors including supply of labor (especially Low Cost-Highly Skilled labor), growing 
middle class, and local industry environments have played important roles for BYD’s innovation. 
For instance, BYD has disseminated the assemble line, and well taken advantage of the abundant 
supply of labor in China by using an army of labor and jigs to replace robot arms in its battery 
production.   
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We believe that a full understanding of the differences between the Chinese local context 
and the mature market in the western countries is a necessary condition for firms’ innovation and 
success in China. Much work remains to be done to test, refine, and expand our arguments. 
China presents both challenge and opportunity for this generation of business leaders in the 
world, and is also the testing ground for this generation of business scholars.  
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